The aim of this paper is to study the ex-ante effects of the implementation of a Non Contributory Pension (NCP) program in Colombia and Peru. Relying on household survey data, we simulate the potential impact of the transfer on poverty, inequality, fiscal cost, and the probability of affiliation to the contributory pension system. This last effect is the most direct behavioural effect one can expect from the implementation of a NCP scheme. For the behavioural response we estimate a Nested Logit Model. Our results show that a NCP in Colombia and Peru contributes to the reduction of poverty and inequality among the elderly, particularly in rural areas at affordable fiscal costs. Furthermore, there is not a large impact on the probability of affiliation to contributory pensions when the program is targeted to the poor (and extreme poor), with the exception of Peruvian women.
Introduction
Old-age poverty in Latin America has been recently studied by Gasparini et al. (2010) , Dethier et al. (2011) and Barrientos (2003 Barrientos ( , 2005 . These studies show that poverty roughly follows a U form relationship with age. Rofman and Oliveri (2011) show disturbing low levels of pension coverage in Latin American countries, both during labour life and retirement. In their sample of 18 Latin American countries, 60% of elderly people (65+) receive a pension, but this figure hides large country differences. In one third of countries, less than 19% of the elderly is recipient of any type of pension (Honduras, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay and Nicaragua). Another group of seven countries exhibit pension coverage between 22% and 60%. In Colombia and Peru, only 23% and 25% of the elderly receive a pension. The major pension reforms spread across Latin America during 1990's, aimed at replacing the public systems by private individual capitalization schemes, have not achieved an improvement in this indicator. Therefore, the governments must look for other options to fight old-age poverty.
It is in this framework that some non contributory pension (NCP) schemes have become popular in Latin America. Distinctive examples are the programs in Brazil (Beneficio de Prestação Continuada) and Mexico (70 y más). The Renta Dignidad (previously known as Bonosol) from Bolivia and the Pension Básica Solidaria (ex PASIS) from Chile are also well known social pension programs. In the case of Chile, the social pension is an innovation on their individual capitalization pension system reformed in 2008. In general, these transfers are focalized to poor elderly individuals who are not pensioners, and consider requisites like age, residence, citizenship, means-test, etc. Programs like the Brazilian and Bolivian are almost universal as these only require residence, citizenship and age of retirement.
One of the immediate effects of these programs is reducing old-age poverty and allowing -finally-retirement with a secure income to the poor elderly. Other effects are related to the positive impacts on life satisfaction and health of the recipients, not to mention the positive outcomes on the rest of the family. In this respect, Galiani and Gertler (2010) offer a comprehensive impact evaluation of the Mexican program 70 y más. For the Brazilian program, the studies by Kassouf et al. (2011) , Barrientos (2005 ), Carvalho Filho (2008 , 2010 and Reis and Camargo (2007) account for some reductions on poverty, elderly work load and child labour, while enhancing school attendance of girls living with the pension recipient 1 .
The aim of this paper is to study the ex-ante effects of the implementation of a NCP program in Colombia and Peru. Relying on household survey data from both countries, we simulate the potential impact of the transfer on i) poverty levels, ii) inequality, iii) fiscal cost, and iv) the probability of affiliation to the contributory pension system. This last effect is the most direct behavioural effect one can expect from the implementation of a transfer scheme without contributions attached. For some individuals, and depending on the generosity of the transfer, the prospect of having a NCP will be a good substitute of pension savings. For the behavioural response we estimate a Nested Logit Model in order to analyze potential changes in the individuals' probability of affiliation to the pension system. We consider two types of program transfers: universal and targeted. In the first case, the beneficiaries are all individuals who have reached the retirement age and have no pension. In the second case, besides the previous requirements, the transfer is targeted to the poor.
Our results show that a NCP in Colombia and Peru contributes to the reduction of poverty and inequality among the elderly, particularly in rural areas at affordable fiscal costs.
The annual cost is about 0.32%-0.45% of GDP with the universal transfer and 0.10%-0.15%
with the targeted scheme. Furthermore, there is not a large impact on the probability of affiliation to contributory pensions when the program is targeted to the poor (and extreme poor), with the exception of Peruvian women for whom there is always a sizeable reduction on their probability of affiliation.
Studies analyzing the behavioural impacts of social pensions, in particular about the effects on the affiliation to contributory pensions, are scarce; in this vein, this paper contributes to the empirical literature on old-age poverty and pension evaluation in Latin America.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we present important background of Colombia and Peru. Section 3 presents the methodology we used to estimate the individual behavioural response. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 reports the effects of a NCP on poverty, inequality, fiscal costs and on the probability of affiliation to contributory pension systems. Finally, section 6 concludes.
Country background
In 2010, there are 3.07 and 1.73 millions of people older than 65 years in Colombia and Peru, representing 7.0% and 5.9% of total population, respectively. Women are majority, with 52.3% of participation in Colombia and 54.1% in Peru. Although the relative size of the elderly population is currently not very high (compared to developed countries), we should keep in mind that this participation will increase in the future due to the aging phenomenon that all countries are experiencing. For instance, the relative weight of elderly people in 2050 will be 17.5% in Colombia and 16.1% in Peru. Certainly, this evolution will have a direct impact on the cost of a NCP scheme.
The poverty rate of the 65+ population is 25.2% and 27.3% in Colombia and Peru. This is lower than the national average, which is 33.5% and 31.3%, respectively (Table 1) . There are notable differences between urban and rural areas. For instance, in Peru, the total poverty rate is 19.1% in the urban area whilst this jumps to 54.2% in the rural area. In the case of the elderly, the poverty rate is 14.6% in the urban area and 48.5% in the rural area. Individuals work until very advanced ages or during the whole life because of the absence of regular incomes during old age (like a pension), which in turn risk their health and physical integrity. This sort of Ceaseless Toil -as noted by Benjamin et al (2003) when analyzing the elderly labour supply in rural China-is common in developing countries.
According to Kassouf et al. (2011) the old poor from Brazil would not be able to ever retire from the labour market if the social pension had not been implemented. In Peru and Colombia, the elderly occupation rate is much larger in the rural area than in the urban area. In table 2 one observes that individuals from rural areas in both countries have higher occupation rates in old ages, which may indicate that they face difficulties to retire from the labour market and must keep working 2 . Source: Authors' elaboration with ECV-2010 and ENAHO-2010 Colombia and Peru are part of the Latin American countries that implemented structural reforms in their pension systems during the 1990's. Under this wave of reforms, many countries created defined contribution (DC) pension systems based on individual capitalization accounts and gave a prominent role to the private sector to manage pension funds. Some countries dismantled completely their old public defined benefit (DB) systems, whilst others kept the public scheme to be a complement to the private scheme in an integrated system.
Different from this practice, only Colombia and Peru maintained both public and private pension systems as two competing schemes 3 . This means that workers in both countries can freely choose either the public or the private pension system.
In the Colombian public pension system, the retirement ages are 55 and 60 years for women and men, respectively (57 and 62 from 2014). People must contribute at least 1,225
weeks; though the contributions will increase by 25 weeks per year up to 1,300 weeks in 2015.
In the private system, an individual can retire at any age, as long as her savings are sufficient to cover a monthly pension higher than 1.1 minimum wages (US$ 319 approximately). Under this regime, the legal retirement age (57 and 62) and the minimum time of contributions (1,300 weeks) only apply if the person requires a guaranteed minimum pension. The contribution rate is 16% to the private or public scheme; the employer is in charge of the 75% of this contribution and the employee is in charge of the 25%. There are 6.5 million people registered in the public pension system (in 2011), but only 31% of them are regular contributors. The private system is composed by 10.2 million affiliates, with 42% effectively contributing. This means that only 28% of the labour force is actually contributing to pensions.
In Peru, the retirement age is 65 years in any pension system. Early retirement is possible in both systems under stringent conditions. The public system offers a minimum pension if the person has at least 20 years of contributions and is 65 years old. In contrast, the private system only offers the minimum pension to those individuals who were born before 1945, provided they have contributed for at least 20 years to any pension system. The final pension amount earned in the public system depends on pension rules that vary according to the amount of contributions and the cohort of birth, whilst that of the private system depends on the funds accrued up to the age of retirement. The contribution rate is 13% and 10% of the wage for the public and private regimes, respectively. In the private scheme, the pension fund administrators charge a fee of about 3% of the wage. The population affiliated to the pension system is 7.8 million (in 2011); 4.9 millions in the private system and 2.9 millions in the public system. This corresponds to 49% of labour force. However, considering only those individuals who are actively contributing, this figure is reduced to 22% of labour force.
The number of elderly receiving a pension is low in both countries and is biased towards richer groups. According to Rofman and Oliveri (2011) Similar to Diether et al. (2011) and Gasparini et al. (2010) , we consider two types of transfers; one being universal and the other mean-tested. In the first case, the NCP is received by all individuals that have reached the retirement age and have no pension. In the second case, besides the previous requirements, the transfer is targeted to the poor. The universal transfer demands more fiscal resources but it is easier to implement because there are not focalization costs.
Impact on poverty and inequality
We compute poverty and inequality indicators before and after the implementation of the NCP scheme. For poverty we use the headcount ratio, classifying the poor according to official poverty lines from each country (built with incomes in Colombia and expenditures in Peru) 4 . For inequality, we estimate the Gini coefficient with the corresponding variable in each country. A Gini coefficient of 0 represents perfect equality, while a coefficient of 1 implies perfect inequality.
Changes in the probability of affiliation to the pension system
Apart from the impacts on poverty and inequality, a NCP scheme has effects on some individuals' decisions. One of the most important and direct effects is, certainly, on the affiliation to the contributory pension system. For some individuals, the prospect of receiving a NCP in the future might be a good substitute to pension savings, so that we will expect a fall in the probability of pension affiliation. In the following we present the framework to estimate this effect.
Consider the individual i maximizes her utility by choosing one of the following three options: i) affiliation to the private system, ii) affiliation to the public system, and iii) no affiliation. Each option is represented by j and associated to utility level , which is a function of the "true" utility V ij (given demographic characteristics of individual i, X i ) and an error term :
( 1) is the result of measurement errors of X i , optimization errors of the individual, and the existence of non observable characteristics in the preferences. The utility maximization implies that option j is chosen if:
The probability of choosing alternative j is:
Assuming that has an extreme value distribution ( ) and is independent and identically distributed over each alternative j (Creedy and Kalb, 2006) , it is possible to find that:
We will consider that the "true" utility is equal to the net pension wealth that each individual i obtains with alternative j, plus a component . This last component does not change with the alternative j and summarizes the individual's preferences, given X i .
The Net Pension wealth is the stream of future pension payments in present value net of costs.  is different for each individual and changes with each alternative j because pension benefits depend on personal circumstances and pension rules of each system. Therefore the appropriate estimation model is the nested Logit model. In the nested models, the alternatives 
The term is known as the dissimilarity parameter, which measures the independence degree in the non-observed utility among the alternatives in the nest Bm. The larger the parameter, the greater the independence degree is. Given the distribution of the unobserved part of the utility, the probability of choosing alternative is the following:
Graphically, the nested model is: In the first nest, the individual decides to affiliate or not to the pension system. If affiliation is chosen, a second nest opens and the individual must choose between the public and the private regime. The advantage of this model is that, contrary to the case of a multinomial Logit, we don't need to assume that the errors are independent and identically distributed.
Net pension wealth
Net pension wealth is the value of all pensions that an individual of age x (today) will receive between retirement age and death, net of costs (contributions and administrative fees).
As pensions and costs are generated in different moments of time, it is necessary to use a discount factor to express all variables in present value. The net pension wealth in the private system is computed as the following:
(10)
Where:
z: Retirement age Present value of the net pension wealth (at current age x) : Pension in the private system : Contribution rate to the pension fund (% of wage) c :
Administrative fees and insurance premium (% of wage) :
Probability of being employed at the age t :
Wage at the age t d : Discount rate r :
Pension fund return rate :
Annuity discount rate RB:
Recognition bond of the contributions made in the public system : Balance in the individual account of capitalization at current age x : Annuity price at retirement age z : Percentage of the pension received by the widow M : Maximum survival age according to official mortality : Probability of survival of pensioner from age z to z+t according to official mortality : Probability of survival of the pensioner's spouse from age y (when the pensioner reaches the retirement age z) to y+t according to official mortality The first term in the right side of equation 8 is the value of the future pension and the second term corresponds to the cost, i.e. pension contributions ( ) and administrative fees (c). When replacing equation 9 into 8, the discounted pension wealth is equivalent to the final balance of the capitalization account plus previous contributions made to the public system (RB). The term indicates expected income, as it takes into account the probability of being employed at age t, earning a wage equal to . The annuity price is defined as the discounted capital needed to finance a unity of life pension. Equation 10 and 11 denote an annuity price for a single and a married affiliated, respectively.
The pension wealth generated in the public system ( ) is:
The public pension depends on the wage and number of years contributed between the affiliation (h) and retirement age (z). The minimum number of years required to receive a minimum pension is 20 in Peru and 25 in Colombia. Obviously, in the case of no affiliation, the net pension wealth is zero:
Net pension wealth for each transition
The computation of the pension wealth must take into account the possibilities of:
changing system, staying in the same system, and exiting from any system. indicates the net pension wealth of an individual of age x affiliated to the private pension who chooses the option j , which are staying in the private system ( ), changing to the public system ( ) and leaving the pension system ( ). The interpretation of wealth variables and is similar. The detailed equations to compute the net pension wealth for each combination showed in figure 2 are placed in appendix 1.
Estimation of labour income
The expected labour income and probability of being employed are estimated with a For those individuals affiliated to the private system, it is also necessary to estimate the stock of funds accumulated in their balances up to current age x. For this, we also use the Heckman regression estimates for each individual and the past average yearly pension fund rates of each country in order to reconstruct the size of the balances. This procedure is done backwards until 1994 (Colombia) and 1993 (Peru), as those are the years of creation of the private pension systems. For each -old enough-individual, we also compute her corresponding Recognition Bond (RB) with the rules of each country and the estimates from the Heckman estimations. Finally, we use a similar procedure to estimate the past contributions of individuals affiliated to the public system. In both cases (private or private affiliation) we assume that individuals start contributing at the age of 25.
Data
We use national household surveys that are representative at national, regional and urban/rural level in both countries for year 2010. In Colombia we use the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida (ECV), whilst in Peru we use the Encuesta Nacional de Hogares (ENAHO). Both surveys are widely used to study poverty and living standards. When the expansion of data is required, we use the sample weights of each survey and must adjust these levels with the most updated population projections. This is particularly important to count the number of elderly people who will receive a social pension. Table 3 shows these population projections. Table 4 reports official monthly poverty lines in Colombia and Peru. This information is needed to find the effects of the social pension on poverty. The amount assumed for this pension will be 60,000 pesos (US$ 31) in Colombia, which correspond to the average old-age transfer that the Government grants to poor elderly in a social program with limited coverage 5 .
In Peru, the amount will be 125 Nuevos Soles (US$ 44), which is equal to the social pension recently implemented (Pensión 65) and still limited to some districts. The last column of table 4 shows the relative importance of the NCP with respect to the poverty lines in different areas.
As expected, the NCP is relatively more important in the rural area, so that we should expect a larger impact in reducing poverty in this area. 
Results
In this section we present the effects of a social pension when this is granted either universally or as a benefit targeted to the poor. A requisite in both cases is that the benefit granted at the legal retirement age and only if the individual is not already receiving another pension. The advantage of the universal pension is that there are not targeting costs, though the fiscal cost is larger. Furthermore, the universal pension is associated with less stigmatization of the low income people 6 .
5 This program is called "Colombia Mayor" and constitutes the bottom of minimum protection for the elderly in the country. The Government is promoting the extension of the program to all people older than 65 years who have no pension and belong to the two lowest levels of socioeconomic classification (SISBEN). It currently covers 933 thousand people. 6 These advantages are similar to the ones suggested in the literature on universal basic income (see Van Parijs, 1997). Extreme poverty falls more for the 65+ people and in rural areas. As before, a NCP has a stronger effect in Peru in reducing extreme poverty for the elderly. For example, extreme poverty falls from 22.9% to 5.9% for the Peruvian elderly of rural areas. The number of potential beneficiaries of the NCP is considerable in both countries (see Before implementing the NCP, inequality is higher in urban areas in both countries (see 
Poverty and inequality

Pension enrolment rates
We measure the effects of a NCP on the probability of affiliation to any of the contributory pension systems. We restrict the sample of individuals to those for whom the simulation exercise is relevant. In consequence, we exclude handicap persons, pensioners, affiliates to special schemes like the military, police, judges, etc., unpaid family workers and full-time students. In addition, the sample is restricted to individuals between 25 and 65 years old in Peru. In Colombia, the sample is restricted to individuals between 25 and 45 years old, otherwise the estimation will be unnecessary more complex because of the different ages of retirement by sex. For the computation of the pension wealth we need some parameters to be assumed and from actual data in each country, which are reported in table 8. Notes: 1/ In Colombia, the minimum pension is equal to one minimum salary. 2/ In Colombia, the maximum pension is equal to 25 minimum salaries.
The expected future income and probability of being employed are computed with the coefficients estimated with the Heckman equations for each country. The explanatory variables of the outcome equation are age, squared age, education and regions. In the selection equation
we add non-labour income and a dummy for marital status to the outcome equation's variables (in appendix 2).
Once the pension wealth associated to each alternative is computed for each individual in the sample, we can incorporate this to the equations of the nested logit model and estimate the probability of affiliation to the private and the public pension system. The event of non affiliation is used as the base outcome. Other control variables apart from pension wealth are disposable income (net of taxes), age, squared age, marital status, education, region and non labour income. priv system pub system priv system pub system priv system pub system priv system pub system net labour income 0.000003 -0.000007 *** -0.000007 *** -0.000003 *** 0.009843 *** -0.00746 *** 0.006545 *** -0.00191 ** *** Sig. at 1%; ** 5%; * 10%.
As expected, pension wealth affects positively and significantly the probability of affiliation to any pension system. This effect is larger for the woman in Peru, but smaller for the Colombian women. The goal of table 9's estimates is compute changes in the probability of affiliation to each pension system when a NCP scheme is introduced. First, we need to check if the individual complies with the requisites to receive a NCP, and then, we compute her corresponding pension wealth. The pension wealth of a NCP is computed according to equation 15. This equation is similar to previous equations that compute the pension wealth of other pension systems, although the main difference is that there are not associated costs (contributions and fees). Second, the NCP wealth ( ) replaces the value of zero that is associated to the outcome of no-affiliation for those individuals in the sample who satisfies the requisites of the NCP scheme. This last step allows us to predict the new probabilities of affiliation with the estimated coefficients of the nested logit model.
(15) Table 10 shows the results of the previously described exercise. In addition to the universal and targeted (to the poor) program, we consider a third program even more narrowly targeted to the extreme poor. In both countries, a universal program will reduce notably the probability of affiliation, particularly in Peru 9 . For example, the Peruvian women have a probability of affiliation of 28.8% before a universal NCP is introduced, but this falls to 10.6% after the transfer. This sizeable effect is related to the overwhelming number of woman without social security coverage. In contrast, the impact of the universal transfer on the probability of affiliation for Peruvian men is lower, which decreases from 36.2% to 28.4%. In Colombia, the probability of affiliation decreases 5.7% for women and 4.5% for men.
If the program is targeted to the poor, there are sizeable effects only for Peruvian woman, which probability of affiliation is reduced by 10.5%. In Colombia, the reduction of the probability of affiliation is less than 1% for both sexes. Similar results are observed when the program is targeted to the extreme poor. With that targeting the reduction of the likelihood of affiliation is only marginal (about less than 0.5%) except for Peruvian women. In the case of Peruvian women, the impact of a pension targeted to the extreme poor (a reduction of 9.7%) is similar to the one of a program targeted to the poor. Women can be more responsive to the introduction of a NCP program because the pension wealth associated to this transfer is larger than that of the men, which is due to the lower mortality of women with respect to men. Recall that in this case the pension wealth is the product between the annuity price -that is affected negatively by mortality-and the NCP amount. Moreover, the larger differences by sex found in the impact of the NCP in Peru reflect the larger differences of mortality profiles of the official tables used in Peru. In Colombia these mortality differences are less pronounced 10 .
Another interesting outcome of our simulation is the evaluation of changes in the probability of affiliation by income quintiles (see table 11 ). As expected, the variation in the probability of affiliation to the contributory systems decreases with the quintile. Furthermore, the targeted programs practically don't affect the behaviour of individuals in the richer quintiles, particularly in Colombia where the transfer is relatively small. In sum, the effects of a NCP on the probability to affiliation to the contributory pension system depend on the design of the scheme. A universal program can cause large reductions on that probability, while that the two targeted programs considered in our exercise have moderate or low effects, except for the Peruvian women.
Fiscal costs
The fiscal cost of each type of scheme is computed by multiplying the transfer amount by the total number of qualified recipients. Table 12 reports the results for a universal NCP scheme and a program targeted to the poor. The universal program costs 0.32% and 0.45% of GDP in Colombia and Peru, whilst the program targeted to the poor sums up 0.10% and 0.15% of GDP, respectively. These amounts are not very high considering that social public expenditures are about 13.6% and 10% of GDP in Colombia and Peru in 2010. Furthermore, a quick inspection into the long run evolution of the elderly population in each country allows us to foresee how NCP's cost can evolve. Figure 3 shows the potential expenditures in NCP programs for the period 2010-2050 based on the most recent UN population projections and assuming a conservative real GDP growth rate of 3%. In both countries, fiscal costs related to NCP increase over the next 25 to 30
years, but later on these costs decrease as the speed of the aging process slows down. 
Conclusions
The relevance of a non contributory pension scheme stems from its expected positive impact on the levels of poverty and inequality, especially among the elderly. The majority of them have no access to a pension and are less attractive in the labour market. A NCP can possibly become in a powerful tool for improving the quality of life of those individuals whose chances of escaping poverty are almost nil. Furthermore, a vast majority of elderly people in rural areas must keep working until a very advanced age -even death-since they are unable to retire with a secure income stream, which in turn puts at risk their health and physical integrity.
A social pension directed towards this group will, certainly, enhance their standard of life.
Our results for Colombia and Peru show that the impacts of a NCP (universal or targeted to the poor) are notable to reduce poverty among the elderly, particularly in rural areas. In Peru, old-age rural poverty rate can be reduced from 48.5% to 23.7% with the introduction of a NCP, whilst in Colombia it falls from 36.7% to 24.6%. The results are modest Colombia -Universal Colombia -Targeted Peru -Universal Peru -Targeted if one considers national poverty rates, though the effect is higher in rural areas than in urban areas.
As for the inequality indicators, the impact of the transfer is rather modest in both countries when considering the whole population. However, the reductions in inequality are more important and statistically significant among the elderly group living in rural areas. In
Colombia, a targeted transfer to the poor reduces the Gini coefficient of the rural elderly from 0.542 to 0.503, whereas in Peru it falls from 0.329 to 0.260. We also observe that there are no sizeable differences between a universal and targeted pension in reducing inequality for rural old Colombians. Contrary to this, the targeted pension in Peru is more important than the universal pension when equalizing incomes. Even if inequality stays at lower but still high levels after the implementation of the NCP, we believe, as evidence has shown, that this program is an important step towards reaching greater equity levels among the elderly.
For every proposal made to improve a society's welfare, it is imperative to estimate and consider its fiscal costs when evaluating the policy's measure. Our estimations reveal that the NCP is not a burdensome proposal. In Colombia, the universal program has an annual cost of 0.32% of the GDP, while the scheme targeted to the poor cost 0.10% of GDP. Similarly, in Peru, implementing a universal program costs 0.45% of GDP, whilst the targeted program sums up 0.15% of GDP. According to the population projections and under conservative estimates of real GDP growth rate in both countries, these percentages can increase only slightly during the next 25 to 30 years.
As for the possible changes in the behaviour of individuals, we observe that a universal transfer can decrease importantly the probability of affiliation to the contributory pension system in both countries, although the effect is larger in Peru. In Colombia this program can reduce the probability of affiliation to contributory systems by about 5%, and in Peru this reduction is about 8% for men and 18% for women. In contrast, a targeted scheme reduces only slightly this probability, being the reduction less than 1% for both sexes in Colombia and less 28 than 2% for Peruvian men. Peruvian women still show a large impact on the probability of affiliation (10.5%). We also assess the impact of a transfer targeted to the extreme poor and detect very small reductions (less than 0.5%) in this probability for Peruvian men and both sexes in Colombia. The persistence of Peruvian women showing a large fall in the probability of affiliation under different transfer types is driven by differences in mortality, a higher prevalence of poverty and extreme poverty and less participation in the formal economy.
In summary, our results show that the implementation of the NCP in Colombia and Peru contributes to the reduction of poverty and inequality among the elderly, particularly in rural areas. In addition, this program has affordable fiscal costs, and we do not expect a large impact on the probability of affiliation of individuals when the program is targeted. The negative impacts on pension saving behaviour and fiscal costs are mostly advocated by detractors of social pension policies, but our results show only moderate effects on these issues. 
